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TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR COLOR:
BASKING IN THE WARMTH OF "SUN GLOW"
"[Ojut of all the colors in the spectrum, greenish-gold.., will be the fo-
cus of this high-court clash. 'It's just a putrid color .... If you sal, it,
you wouldn't know why anyone wouldfight over it."'1
INTRODUCTION
In Qualitex v. Jacobson Products, Co.2 the United States Supreme
Court resolved the disagreement among the federal circuits over whether
color alone may receive trademark protection.3 The Court ruled that
color may receive trademark protection under the Lanham Act,4 the law
* The author would like to express her warmest gratitude to Professor Rena Se-
plowitz of Touro Law Center for her invaluable guidance and support and to Danielle
Marchiel for her editorial work above and beyond the call of duty.
1. Paul M. Barrett, Color in the Court: Can Tints Be Trademarked?, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 5, 1995, at BI, B6. An attorney for Jacobson Products Co. made this remark prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300
(1995).
2. 115 S. Ct. 1300.
3. Id at 1302. Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 1051-1127.
the Supreme Court had ruled that trademarks consisting solely of a color are not register-
able. A. Leshen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 171
(1906) (stating "[whether mere color can constitute a valid trademark may admit of
doubt Doubtless it may, if it be impressed in a particular design, as a circle, square, tri-
angle, a cross, or a star. But the authorities do not go farther than this").
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 and Supp. 1993). Section 1052 states in perti-
nent part:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account
of its nature unless it-
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter....
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the
United States ....
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying particu-
lar living individual except by his written consent ....
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark of trade name previously used
in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely ... to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive: Provided, That if the
Commissioner determines that confusion, mistake, or deception is not
likely to result from the continued use by more than one per-
son... concurrent registrations may be issued ....
(e) Consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of
1
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governing federal trademark protection.5 Although the Supreme Court's
decision in Qualitex eliminated a per se rule barring trademark protec-
tion for color, significant hurdles await those seeking such protection.
Color must meet the traditional trademark requirements including sec-
ondary meaning, absence of functionality and non-descriptiveness. 6
Furthermore, it must overcome those obstacles particular to trademark
protection such as shade confusion and color depletion.7 A discussion of
them, (2) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is
primarily geographically descriptive of them... (3) when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically de-
ceptively misdescriptive of them, or (4) is primarily merely a surname.
(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (c)(3) of
this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark
used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's
goods in commerce. The Commissioner may accept as prima facie evidence
that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the
applicant's goods in commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and con-
tinuous use thereof as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five
years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made. Noth-
ing in this section shall prevent the registration of a mark which, when used
on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, is primarily geographi-
cally deceptively misdescriptive of them, and which became distinctive of
the applicant's goods in commerce before December 8, 1993.
Id. § 1052.
5. 115 S. Ct. at 1302. Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052-1127 (1988 and
Supp. 1993), "[a]ny person who wishes to distinguish his goods from others used in
commerce" may obtain trademark protection. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Park & Fly, Inc., 489
F. Supp. 422, 424 (D. Mass. 1979). As drafted, the Lanham Act "assumes that the appli-
cant has developed a trademark and states that no trademark may be denied registration
except for specific reasons such as fraud, misrepresentation, obscenity, deception or
other violations of public policy set forth in the Act." William J. Keating, Development
of Evidence to Support Color-Based Trademarks, 9 J.L. & CoM. 1, 5 (1989) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1052 (1982 and Supp. 1987)). The Act does, however, prohibit registration if
others have attained prior rights to the mark. Id. The trademark may consist of "any
word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 1045 (1988 and
Supp. 1993). A mark will receive registration unless it falls into one of the exceptions
enumerated in § 1052 of the Lanham Act. Park 'N Fly, 489 F. Supp. at 424; 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052 (a)-(f) (1988 and Supp. 1993). Registration of a trademark creates a rebuttable
presumption that the mark is valid and the registrant maintains the right to use the mark
exclusively. Id. at 424. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1056-59 for more information on trademark
registration, such as certificates of trademark registration, duration of registration, and
renewal of registration, §§ 1062-64 for information on examination and publication, and
§§ 1066-71 for information on interference and appeals; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1112-13
for classification and fees.
.6. See infra notes 11-79 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 80-112 and accompanying text.
[Vol 12
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the case law preceding the Qualitex decision is useful in understanding
the difficulties facing those seeking trademark protection for color.
Part I of this Comment will examine the disagreement among the fed-
eral circuits prior to the Supreme Court's decision, as well as explains
the trademark requirements of secondary meaning and absence of func-
tionality. Additionally, the color depletion and shade confusion theories
will be explained in this section.8 Part II will analyze the Qualitex deci-
sion of the Ninth Circuit, and its subsequent reversal by the United
States Supreme Court.9 This Comment will conclude by arguing that
acquisition of trademark protection for color will continue to be diffi-
cult, despite the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Qualitex.lO
I. DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
A. Courts Permitting Trademark Protection For Color: The Federal
Circuit's Decision in In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas and the Secon-
dwy Meaning Requirement
A trademark applicant must establish that the color has achieved a
"secondary meaning"11 that identifies the goods or services as coming
from a particular source in the mind of the consuming public. 12 The
United States Patent and Trademark Office [hereinafter "PTO"] places
the burden on the applicant to provide evidence demonstrating that the
mark is recognized by consumers. 13
8. See infra notes 11-112 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 113-148 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 149-161 and accompanying text.
11. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The court stated that: "Section 2(t) [of the Lanham Act] provides that 'nothing in this
chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become
distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce,' codi~jjng the common-law doctrine of
secondary meaning." Id (emphasis added).
12. William J. Keating, Development of Evidence to Support Color-Based Trade-
marks, 9 J.L. & COm. 1, 5 (1989) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(t) (1982 and Supp. 1987)).
See Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1983). "[T]o establish secondary
meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary signifi-
cance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the
product itself." Id. at 851 n. 11 (citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111, 118 (1938)).
13. See Keating, supra note 12, at 5-6.
1995]
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Secondary meaning is one of the most heavily weighted requirements
for trademarks, as evidenced by In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas,14
where secondary meaning was a central issue. Owens-Coming's appli-
cation for trademark protection of its pink fiberglass insulation was de-
nied by the PTO's Trial and Appeal Board [hereinafter "the Board"].15
Though the Board denied registration, it found that "the overall color of
goods is capable of functioning as a trademark." 16 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's decision
and found that Owens-Coming was entitled to trademark protection for
its pink insulation. 17
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that the Lanham Act
was intended to modernize trademark law, as well as to "facilitate com-
merce and to protect the consumer."18 It stated: "[t]he legislative history
of the Act as a whole describes its objective as making registration
'more liberal,' dispensing with 'mere technical prohibitions and arbi-
trary provisions' and modernizing the trademark statutes 'so that they
will conform to legitimate present-day business practice."'l 9
The court determined that the pink fiberglass insulation satisfied all of
the traditional trademark requirements. Specifically, the pink color was
not utilitarian to the product; however, it had acquired secondary mean-
ing.20 The court concluded that:
OCF's use of the color "pink" performs no non-trademark function, and
is consistent with the commercial and public purposes of trademarks. A
pink color mark registers for fibrous glass insulation does not confer a
"monopoly" or act as a barrier to entry in the market. It serves the classi-
cal trademark function of indicating the origin of the goods, and thereby
protects the public .... 21
In addition, the court rejected the application of the color depletion
theory, which if utilized, would constitute "an unreasonable restriction
on the acquisition of trademark rights."22 The court found that there was
14. 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
15. Id. at 1118.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1128.
18. Id. at 1119.
19. Id. (quoting In re E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1360
(C.C.P.A. 1973)) (footnotes omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1123.
22. Id. at 1122. The court cited the Lanham Act's legislative history:
Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible
a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one
from another. Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to
[Vol 12
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"no competitive need ... for colors to remain available to all competi-
tors."23 The court further stated that "this theory is not faulted for ap-
propriate application, but following passage of the Lanham Act courts
have declined to perpetuate its per se prohibition which is in conflict
with the liberating purposes of the Act.' 24
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. is illustrative of the heavy bur-
den that must be met by an applicant attempting to establish secondary
meaning. The Owens-Conhig court noted that the Lanham Act was
"silent as to the weight of evidence required" to demonstrate secondary
meaning under section 2(f).25 However, the court explained that a
showing of exclusive use for five years immediately preceding the ap-
plication for trademark protection may be considered prima facie evi-
dence of secondary meaning.26
The Owens-Corning court devoted a considerable portion of its opin-
ion to a discussion of the scope and magnitude of the company's adver-
tising. The court noted that the company had spent approximately
$42,421,000 advertising pink insulation to consumers via television, ra-
dio, newspapers and magazines from 1972 to 1981.27 It estimated that it
had expended "$11,400,000 in the year 1981 alone." 28 Additionally,
Owens-Coming submitted its advertising schedule to the Examiner and
the Board. The schedule revealed that within a seven month period,
Owens-Corning had advertised pink insulation in nearly two hundred
blocks of network advertising time during the broadcasting of many
major sporting events, such as the World Series, Super Bowl, U.S. Ten-
nis Open and the Rose Bowl.29
The court scrutinized the content of television and radio commercials,
articles, promotions to real estate developers and consumer survey in-
the producer the benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates. To pro-
tect trademarks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair com-
petition, and to secure the business community from advantages of reputation and
good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to
those who have not. This is the end to which this bill is directed.
M at 1123. (quoting S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 (1946)).
23. Id.
24. Id at 1120.
25. Id at 1125.
26. IM See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), supra note 4. The court warned that courts must
decide each case upon its individual facts in order to comply with efficient
"administrative and judicial implementation of the statute." Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at
1120.
27. Id at 1125.
28. Id
29. Id. at 1126.
1995]
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formation.30 The Board originally held that the evidence submitted did
not demonstrate secondary meaning because it had not "establish[ed]
that those [survey] respondents associate[d] pink insulation with a single
source."3 1 The Federal Circuit disagreed, and reversed, holding that the
Board had placed "an inappropriately heavy evidentiary burden" on
Owens-Corning. 32 The court found that the company had clearly met the
statutory trademark requirements, and therefore, the mark was entitled to
obtain protection. 33
Judge Bissel's ardent dissent in this case set forth four arguments as to
why colors should not receive trademark protection. First, Judge Bissel
argued that a deviation from the established precedents would poten-
tially have a "divisive effect" on the law.34 Allowing trademark protec-
tion for color would create inconsistency among the circuits, encourage
forum shopping and defeat the "valuable public interest in consistency
and predictability in the law."35 Second, the judge argued that color cur-
rently receives sufficient protection under trademark law when used in
conjunction with an arbitrary symbol or design, though that was not true
in the case of pink insulation.36 Third, the judge feared that if protection
30. Id. at 1126-27. The court described Owens-Coming's advertising: "[T]wo dif-
ferent commercials aired during this time featured the 'Pink Panther,' a pink cartoon
character. .. Mhe narration of these commercials discusses how homeowners can cut
the cost of [home heating] if they would 'add another layer of pink' Id. at 1126. The
court further described commercials that depicted "an igloo encased in a 'pink' blanket
of [plaintiff's] insulation." Id. Some of the slogans utilized by plaintiff included "Pink of
Perfection;" "The Pink Cooler;" "Love that Pink;" "America's Favorite Pink Product;"
"Put your House in the Pink;" "Beat the Cold with Pink;" and "Plant Some Pink Insula-
tion in your Attic." Id. at 1126-27.
31. Id. at 1127.
32. Id. at 1128.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1129 (Bissel, J., dissenting). Judge Bissel stated:
Lawyers have advised clients, clients have conducted their affairs, litigants have
won, lost and settled, all in light of the interpretation universally applied by the
federal courts. Discarding the established jurisprudence and breaking away from
the lines of decisions in the regional circuits will have a divisive effect on the
trademark law. To create such a fundamental division in the law is directly con-
trary to this court's mandate to bring uniformity to the law and will inevitably in-
vite forum-shopping.
Id.
35. Id. (Bissel, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1129-30 (Bissel, J., dissenting). Judge Bissel explained that,
"[u]nfortunately for Owens-Coming... [c]olor uniformly applied to a product is not a
design because it has not been used in connection or combination with or impresses in
some definite arbitrary symbol or design." Id. at 1130 (Bissel, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
[Vol 12
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 12 [2020], No. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss1/6
TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR COLOR
were granted, competitors would be precluded from entering the market,
a result which would be at odds with the purpose of trademark law:37
"[t]he 'property' in trademark is the right to prevent confusion, not to
bar new entrants into the market." 38 Fourth, Judge Bissel cited problems
of color confusion.39
In contrast to the majority's opinion, Judge Bissel agreed with the
Board's determination that Owens-Coming's product had failed to attain
secondary meaning.40 Bissel opined that although the company had
demonstrated evidence of advertising expenditures, it did not demon-
strate "to what extent that advertising has emphasized 'pink' as a
mark."4 1 Judge Bissel argued that market survey data submitted to the
court indicating "that some 50% of male homeowners who responded to
the survey question knew the applicant makes insulation that is pink
does not establish that those respondents associate pink insulation with a
single source,"42 and therefore, the data did not establish secondary
meaning.
Secondary meaning was also heavily weighted in DAP Products v.
Color Tile,43 in which a federal district court found that secondary
meaning had attached to DAP's red plastic bucket packaging44 for its
37. Id. at 1130 (Bissel, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (Bissel, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1131 (Bissel, J., dissenting). "The final reason for the general rule that
denies to one the appropriation of a particular color is that infringement actions could
soon denigrate into questions of shade confusion:' Id (Bissel, J., dissenting). Thus, ac-
tions for the registration and subsequent infringement of colors will be brought over the
slightest deviation in the color. Where will the line be drawn? By not allowing such reg-
istration, the courts are avoiding the inevitable suits over such trivial matters.
40. Id (Bissel, J., dissenting).
41. Id at 1130 (Bissel, J., dissenting). See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text
for detailed discussion of the evidence that was presented regarding Owens-Coming's
advertising and expenditures.
42. Id at 1131 (Bissel, J., dissenting).
43. 821 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Ohio 1993)
44. Id. at 489. In 1978, DAP began to sell an adhesive known as mastic. Id. The
mastic was originally packaged in various sizes of white or black containers that resem-
bled the generic containers used by other mastic manufacturers. d Since the 3 1/2 gallon
size was the most popular, DAP altered the appearance of the packaging and began to
market the mastic in red 3 1/2 gallon buckets. Id The significance of this decision is
rooted in the fact that no other mastic product was packaged in a similar red 3 1/2 gallon
bucket and DAP "decided to provide a distinctive appearance for [the mastic]." Id.
(emphasis added). In 1990, Color Tile, a competitor, began packaging its mastic in 3 1/2
gallon red buckets that "did not contain any indications of the identity of the manufactur-
ers or the place where the product was manufactured, so consumers would not know
whose product was in the red bucket." Id. at 490. By copying DAP's packaging. Color
Tile realized an increase in mastic sales. Id.
1995]
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tile mastic in an action alleging trade dress infringement.45 The court
found secondary meaning from the intentional copying of DAP's pack-
aging by its competitors because "there is no logical reason for the at-
tempt at copying save an attempt to realize upon secondary meaning that
is in existence." 46
The court explained secondary meaning and stated that:
[t]o acquire secondary meaning in the minds of the buying public, an ar-
ticle of merchandise, when shown to a prospective customer, must
prompt the affirmation, 'This is the article I want because I know its
source,' and not the negative inquiry as to 'Who makes that article?' In
other words, the article must proclaim its identification with its source
and not simply stimulate inquiry about it.47
B. Courts Denying Trademark Protection for Color: The Functionality
Requirement as Applied by the Seventh, Eleventh and Federal Cir-
cuits
Many manufacturers have found it difficult to overcome the absence
of functionality requirement. The courts seek to prevent the inherent un-
fairness that would flow from granting trademark protection for a feature
that is functional in nature. The Supreme Court stated in Qualitex that "a
product feature is functional and cannot serve as a trademark if it is es-
sential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or qual-
ity of the article." 48 Granting a monopoly on a functional feature would
effectively bar competitors from entering the market.49 The following
45. Id. at 492. "The term trade dress refers to how a product looks, its total image,
or its overall appearance. As such, it includes a product's 'composition and design, in-
cluding size, shape, color, texture and graphics."' Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cos-
metics Mfg., Inc., 65 F.3d 1063, 1068 (2nd Cir. 1995) (quoting Coach Leatherware Co.,
v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168 (2nd Cir. 1991)).
46. Id. at 492. But see Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull, Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1530
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff did not show secondary meaning despite it
submission of a market survey which demonstrated that 73% of the respondents surveyed
made an association between the company and black outboard engines).
47. DAP Prods., 821 F. Supp. at 492 (citations omitted).
48. Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods., Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995) (citing Inwood
Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
49. Id. The Qualitex court explained the functionality doctrine in the following
manner:
[M]o take an imaginary example, that even if customers have come to identify the
special illumination-enhancing shape of a new patented light bulb with a particu-
lar manufacturer, the manufacturer may not use that shape as a trademark, for
doing so, after the patent had expired, would impede competition - not by pro-
[Vol 12
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factors have been used to determine if a feature is functional: "1)
whether a particular design yields a utilitarian advantage, 2) whether
alternative designs are available in order to avoid hindering competition,
and 3) whether the design achieves economies in manufacturing or
use." 50
One of the classic cases supporting denial of trademark protection
based upon a color's functionality is Life Savers v. Curtiss Candy Co.51
In that case, the plaintiff, Life Savers Corp., sought a permanent injunc-
tion against defendant, Curtiss Candy Co., to stop its use of a label with
a multi-colored striped background for its assorted flavored hard-candy
discs.52 The plaintiff's action was based upon trademark infringement as
wvell as unfair competition.53 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's determination that no trademark infringement or unfair competi-
tion had been established. 54 The court found that it was a "general prac-
tice of the trade" for hard candy manufacturers to sell their candy in
packages with "multi-colored background[s] for their assorted flavored
discs, and labels with single-colored background for their packages for
their packages containing one flavor of candy discs."55 The court stated
that:
[tihe color of the background is in fact descriptive and serves as a ready
identification of the flavor of the candy in the package. The use of a
combination of colored stripes as a background indicated to the con-
sumer that the package contains an assortment of candy discs or tablets
of various colors and flavors.56
tecting the reputation of the original bulb maker, but by frustrating competitors'
legitimate efforts to produce an equivalent illumination enhancing bulb.
Id. at 1304.
50. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
51. 182 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1950).
52. Id at 6.
53. Id at 5. The court described the similarity of the packaging:
Both plaintiff and defendant manufacture and market hard candy discs of various
colors and flavors in cylindrical-shaped packages or rolls about 2 3/4 inches in
length and 3/4 of an inch in diameter. Each package or roll bears an identifying
label and contains eleven candy disks .... To illustrate: plaintiff and defendant
market lime flavored candy discs in wrappers with a green background, lemon
flavored discs in wrappers with a yellow background ....
Id at 5-6.
54. Id at 9.
55. Id at 7.
56. Id.
19951
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The court deemed the label "functional" and ruled that preventing the
defendants and other candy manufacturers from using striped back-
grounds would give the plaintiff a "monopoly" on multi-colored striped
backgrounds which were essentially descriptive of the package's con-
tents. 57
Comparably, in Ambrit v. Kraft,58 the Eleventh Circuit held that royal
blue, when used to package frozen desserts, was functional and could
not be monopolized in a trademark.59 "Royal blue is a 'cool color;' it is
suggestive of coldness and used by a multitude of ice cream and frozen
dessert producers." 60 Therefore, "any order precluding Kraft from using
the color royal blue must be tailored to achieve the goal of protecting the
consuming public from confusion," yet avoid creating a monopoly.6 1
Similarly, the court in Specialty Surgical Instrumentation Inc. v. Phil-
lips62 found that the use of the color gray by the plaintiff, SSI, in its
promotional materials was primarily functional, and thus refused to
grant protection for its trade dress.63 The color gray was found to be
utilitarian because it "serves to make SSI's catalogs more effective as
the color gray highlights the design of the instruments in SSI's cata-
logs." 64 Had the court provided protection for the color gray in this case,
it would have precluded competitors in the surgical instrument industry
from their "reasonable right" to use the color gray to highlight their in-
struments. 65 In sum, the court found a "competitive need for the color
gray in the surgical instruments industry." 66
The doctrine of "aesthetic functionality" has also prevented colors
from receiving trademark protection in some courts. According to this
doctrine, the function of a color lies in its aesthetic appeal, making it
more desirable to consumers. This differs from the traditional doctrine
of functionality in which the color serves a utilitarian purpose i.e., to
communicate a meaning, such as royal blue signals "coolness." 67 In
57. Id. at 8-9 (stating that "[p]laintiff's and defendant's labels lack any similarity in
appearance except that the background of each has multi-colored stripes and, as we have
seen, this is a functional aspect of each label.").
58. 812 F.2d 1531 (lIth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
59. Id. at 1548.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 844 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
63. Id. at 1217-18. See supra note 45 for definition of trade dress.
64. Id. at 1217 (describing the catalog as having a gray background for photographs
and line drawings).
65. Id. at 1217-18.
66. Id. at 1218.
67. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
[Vol 12
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Deere & Co. v. Farmhand I1c., 68 the court denied trademark protection
for the color green due to alleged consumer preferences of color.69
Deere sought protection for the shade of green that has become known
as "John Deere green"70 and an injunction to prevent its competitor from
using that or any "confusingly similar" shade of green.7l The court de-
nied protection on the ground that the color was "aesthetically func-
tional."72 The court stated that "the determinative question on the issue
of functionality is whether protection against imitation will hinder the
competitor in competition ... [U]nder the doctrine of aesthetic function-
ality, the inquiry should focus on the extent to which the design feature
is related to the utilitarian function of the product or feature."73
The court found that a monopoly on the color "John Deere green"
would prevent competitors from offering equipment to the consumers in
the color they desired due to its aesthetically pleasing quality.74
In Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull, Ltd.,75 the Federal Circuit held
that a company could not receive registered trademark protection for the
color black used on the outboard engines it manufactured. 76 The court
cited the Board's decision to deny protection because black as applied to
engines was "dejure" functional:77
68. 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (holding that Deere's use of the color green
was functional within the meaning of the Lanham Act), qajd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.
1983).
69. Id. at 98.
70. Id at 88. Deere & Company [hereinafter "Deere"] is a manufacturer of farm
machinery and equipment. Id In the industry, the color was known as "John Deere
green." Id. Thus, the color itself had become a means of identifying Deere products. Id
Furthermore, Deere alleged that Farmland had designed its front-end loaders in a similar
way to Deere's "front-end loader," which "embod[ies] distinctive exterior design features
that give the loaders a unique configuration or appearance that serves the purpose of
identifying [John Deere products]." Id.
71. Id. at96.
72. Id. at 98.
73. Id. (citing Keene v. Paraflex Indus., Inc. 653 F.2d. 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
74. Id. The court based this conclusion on the fact that farmers like to match their
loaders to their tractors. Id. The court analogized this preference to that of consumers in
Keene, -which involved lighting fixtures that were designed to match the architecture of a
building. Id (citing Keene v. Paraflex Industries, Inc. 653 F.2d. 822 (3d Cir. 1981). See
contra In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The
Owens-Corning court found that in the case of fibrous glass insulation, w hich has a
"light yellow-white coloring" in its natural state, there was no utilitarian purpose for
dying fiberglass insulation pink. Id. at 1122. In fact, the evidence indicated that Oens-
Coming was the only manufacturer to dye its insulation. Id.
75. 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1994).
76. Id at 1532.
77. Id at 1529.
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[B]lack is more desirable from the perspective of prospective purchasers
because it is color compatible with a wide variety of boat colors and be-
cause objects colored black appear smaller than they do when they are
painted either lighter or brighter colors. The evidence shows that people
who buy outboard motors for boats like the colors of the motors to be
harmonious with the colors of their vessels, and that they also find it de-
sirable under some circumstances to reduce the perception of the size of
the motors in proportion to the boats. 78
The -case law is not specific as to what factors should be considered in
determining whether a color is "aesthetically functional." Thus, it can be
especially difficult to establish that a color is not aesthetically func-
tional.79
C. The Third Circuit: The Color Depletion Theory
One of the most serious obstacles facing those seeking trademark
protection for color is the color depletion theory, which has been "the
most widely used justification for denying trademark rights to colors."80
The underlying premise of this theory is the belief that granting trade-
mark protection would eventually "deplete the reservoir" of colors and
interfere with the "free availability of colors." 8 1 Essentially, the argu-
ment states that the spectrum features a finite number of colors.
78. Id.
79. See Susan Upton Douglass, Color Me Happy: The Supreme Court Rules On the
Trademark Registrability of Color, 5 J. OF PROPRIETARY RTs. 2, 9-10 (1995). This article
offers some practical advice for those seeking trademark protection for a color:
Some colors may be deemed "functional" because they are associated with
the category of products: for example, pink is associated with products for little
girls, and bright primary colors are associated with toys and sporting equipment.
Green signals to consumers that the product is environmentally friendly. It is un-
likely that such colors would ever acquire secondary meaning and become
source-indicating.
80. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Channellock, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 873, 876 (W.D. Pa.
1992) (stating that trademark issues are better resolved by a "full hearing before a 'fair
minded' jury" rather than by summary judgment "so that a 'reasonable' decision may be
made regarding the validity of [the] trademark.").
81. Id. In Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of functionality would prevent problems such as color depletion because the
doctrine would not permit exclusive use of an important product characteristic.
Prior to Qualitex, some scholars had opined that the color depletion theory should not
act to bar trademark protection for color.
[W]hen a color is nonfunctional for the product, even though the appropriator has
a large percentage of the market, a competitor may still viably compete in the
market by making his product better and/or cheaper, using a different color of
shade, or no color at all. We should not penalize the trademark applicant for is
12
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The Third Circuit's decision in Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co. 82
is illustrative of the denial of trademark protection under the color de-
pletion theory. Campbell Soup sought an injunction against Armour to
stop that company's use of a "red and white label used on some of its
food products."83 The court found that "[tihe Campbell red is not the
same as [Armour's] Carnation red."84 Additionally, the court found that
Armour's Carnation red "is not the same on all of its products," and
"[the usual Armour label is white over red instead of red over white, as
the plaintiffs use the colors, but in some cases Armour uses the red and
white bands vertically."85
After deciding that the plaintiffs were seeking the exclusive right to
use "half red and half white labels" for food items,86 the court stated that
such a trademark would allow the plaintiffs a monopoly on all shades of
red.8 7 The court reasoned that if it granted the trademark, "the next
manufacturer may monopolize orange in all its shades and the next yel-
low in the same way. Obviously, the list of colors will soon run out."88
very success in the marketplace in acquiring secondary meaning. Nor should we
confuse the consumer by allowing confusingly similar uses of color on similar
products by competitors.
Marc Lieberstein and Susan L. Cohen, Protecting Color, N.Y. ST. B.A. INTELL PROP.
LAWvNEWSL (Vol. 2, No. 1) (1993) (citation omitted).
82. 175 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1949). One court stated that this case stands for the
proposition that "[the fact that] a man cannot acquire a trade-mark by color alone has
been stated a good many times in decisions and te.xtbooks." Life Savers v. Curtiss Candy
Co., 82 F.2d 4,9 (7th Cir. 1950).
83. Campbell Soup Co.. 175 F.2d at 796.
84. IdH at 798.
85. Id
86. I&
87. Id.
88. Id. The court held that trademark protection cannot be obtained for color alone.
Id at 798. The court noted that the company might receive trademark protections in
other ways: "In denying the plaintiffs the exclusive use of color alone we are not passing
upon the question whether they have acquired trademarks entitled to protection in the
sum total of the combinations which make up their respective labels for their goods." Id.
at 799. See James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel and Wire Works, 128 F.2d 6, 9 (6th
Cir. 1942) (explaining that color is not subject to trademark monopoly unless it is used in
combination with "some definite, arbitrary symbol or in association with some charac-
teristics which serve to distinguish the article as made or sold by a particular person")-
Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729 (6th Cir. 1906) (holding
that "as a rule, a color cannot be monopolized to distinguish a product"): Pacific Coast
Condensed Milk Co. v. Frye & Co., 147 P. 865, 869 (Wash. 1915) (stating that -It]he
primary colors are few, and as the evidence shows those suitable for light products, such
as milk, are even more limited. To allow them to be appropriated as distinguishing marks
would foster monopoly by foreclosing the use by others of any tasty dress.").
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D. Shade Confusion in the Seventh Circuit: A Per Se Prohibition
Against Granting Trademark Protection
Shade confusion, a theory somewhat related to the color depletion
theory, provides that if colors receive trademark protection, disputes
would arise concerning the similarity of a protected color and those of
competitors. 89 The theory provides that it would be very difficult for
courts to determine whether infringement had occurred.
In NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp.,90 NutraSweet contended that its
competitor's sweetener, "Sweet One," was packaged similarly to its arti-
ficial sweetener which was sold in blue packets. 9 1 Although the com-
pany did not allege that the packaging was identical, it claimed that
"based on market research, that the shades of blue are confusingly simi-
lar."92 In denying protection of NutraSweet's blue packet, the court
noted that "[t]he case before the court provides a vivid example of the
problems with shade confusion," which it found could only be settled
through litigation. 93
Defendant's company revolutionized the sugar industry by selling re-
fined, white granulated sugar in "small single-serving size white packets
or envelopes." 94 These packets are now found in practically all food es-
tablishments, served in bowls or caddies. From 1948 to 1958, the defen-
dants' packaged sugar was the only sugar of its kind.95 In 1958, the de-
fendants introduced a low calorie sugar substitute under the brand name
"Sweet 'N Low."96 The new product was packaged in "single-serving
pink paper packets" 97 and was served together with the white sugar
packets in food establishments. 98
89. See generally JEROME GILSON & JEFFREY M. SAMUELS, 1 TRADEMARK PRO-
TECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.11, at 2-158.5 (1995) ("It remains to be seen whether the
courts in particular cases will consider color marks weak or strong, and what procedures
they will follow in determining whether a shade of blue, for example, is likely to cause
confusion with a federally registered shade of blue-green."); J. THOMAS McCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.16, at 7-69 (3rd ed. 1992)
("[I]f a color per se could be appropriated as a trademark symbol, determination of in.
fringement would degenerate into deciding questions of 'shade confusion' between
closely similar color shades.").
90. 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991).
91. ld. at 1026.
92. Id. at 1027.
93. Id.
94. ld. at 1025.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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In 1981, the plaintiffs introduced a sugar substitute of their own,
"Equal," packaged in blue single-serving packets. 99 In 1988, the defen-
dants introduced another sugar substitute to the market, "Sweet One,"
also packaged in blue single-serving packets.O0
The district court denied NutraSweet's motion for a preliminary in-
junction and granted summary judgment for the defendants.101 Stating
that the "fundamental issue" before the court was "whether mere color
should ever be accorded trade-dress protection under Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act," 102 the Seventh Circuit ultimately held that color may
not be granted trademark protection, except in conjunction with a design
or symbol.103 The court refused to grant protection for NutraSweet's
blue sweetener packets because such protection would prevent others
from entering the market, as well as create problems with shade confu-
sion. 104
The Seventh Circuit in NutraSweet adopted the reasoning in Judge
Bissel's dissent in Owens-Corning.105 The court cited Judge Bissel's
four reasons for adopting per se prohibition of color trademarks:
(1)"[c]onsistency and predictability of the law," (2) protection already
available for color when used in connection with a symbol or design, (3)
barriers to competitors entering the market, and (4) shade confusion.106
The NutraSweet court found that "the case before the court provides a
vivid example of problems with shade confusion .... NutraSweet
[argued that] ... based upon market research, [it had proved] that the
shades of blue are confusingly similar." 107
Additionally, the court determined that a fact-driven standard, requir-
ing the court to determine whether the trademark would prevent future
competitors from entering the market, would "prove unworkable, for
there is no way for a court to predict the likelihood of future competitors
99. Id at 1026.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id
103. Id. at 1027 (citing Life Savers v. Curtiss Candy Co., 82 F.2d 4, 9 (7th Cir.
1950)). "As a rule color cannot be monopolized to distinguish a product. Color is not
subject to trade-mark monopoly except in connection with some definite arbitrary sym-
bol or design." Id (citations omitted).
104. Id at 1028.
105. Id
106. Id at 1027-28.
107. Id. at 1027. The court queried, "[how different do the colors have to be? Under
NutraSwet's proposed test, the only way to answer that question is through litigation.-
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in a particular market." 108 Though finding that NutraSweet could re-
ceive protection for its trade dress, the court denied trademark protec-
tion, stating that "[t]he essential purpose of trademark law is to prevent
confusion, not to bar new entrants into the market." 109 If the fact-driven
rule proposed by Nutrasweet were to be adopted, the court opined that
trial courts would be required to "scrutinize the tabletop sweetener mar-
ket to determine the number of competitors and the likelihood of future
competitors in that market to determine whether there is a competitive
need for the color blue to remain available."l 10 Thus, the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's judgment that "as a matter of law, color
is not subject to trademark protection."l I I
In Qualitex, the Supreme Court held that the potential for shade con-
fusion should not act as a per se bar against receiving trademark protec-
tion. The Court reasoned that courts are often required to make subtle
distinctions, and such were generally capable of differentiating between
shades of a color.112 Therefore, the Court held that potential shade con-
fusion problems should not act as a bar to trademark protection for color
alone.
II. QUALITEX IN THE COURTS
A. The Ninth Circuit
The Qualitex Company manufactured and sold pads for dry cleaning
presses which were dyed an unusual green-gold color, called "SUN
GLOW."I1 3 The company had been using "Sun Glow" since the
1950's. 1 14 Qualitex contended that this color functioned as a trademark
because it indicated the source of the press pads and distinguished the
product from other press pads.] 15
108. Id. at 1028.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1026.
112. Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
113. Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994), rev d, 115
S. Ct. 1300 (1995). Qualitex's predecessor had previously registered the mark in 1959.
Id.
114. Id. at 1302.
t15. Id.
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Qualitex received trademark registration for the green-gold color in
1991.116 In 1989, Jacobson had begun producing and selling a press pad
in the same greenish-gold color as Qualitex's press pad, under tile name
"Magic Glow."117 The similarity of the press pads was not accidental;
Jacobson had "admitted intentionally copying the overall look of
Qualitex's green-gold press pad."1 8 As a result, Qualitex initiated a suit
against Jacobson alleging trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tion.119 The district court awarded damages for both trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition and granted an injunction to prevent
Jacobson from "manufacturing, marketing, or selling press pads of the
same green-gold color as the pads marketed by Qualitex." 120
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Qualitex's trademark for "Sun
Glow" was invalid, but affirmed the judgment for unfair competition. 121
The court noted that although the Lanham Act does not explicitly bar the
registration of color, the "courts of appeals generally have refused to
grant trademark protection for color alone." 122 After giving considera-
tion to the majority's position in Owens-Corning, the Ninth Circuit
adopted the position of Judge Bissel's dissent: "We conclude that the
better rule is that a trademark should not be registered for color
alone." 123 The court found that shade confusion problems would be in-
surmountable for those seeking to trademark color alone. 124 The court
also found there to be "[a]dequate protection ... available when color is
combined in distinctive patterns or design or combined in distinctive
logos."125 Finally, the court noted that additional protection is afforded
under unfair competition principles.126
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1299-1300.
120. Id. at 1300.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1301 (citing In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116. 1128.
n.2 (Bissel, J., dissenting)).
123. Id. at 1302.
124. Id The court stated: "As many cases have noted, under the color depletion the-
ory, no person should have a monopoly on a primary color. We recognize that there are
countless shades of colors that could not be depleted, but then, we could well become
involved in 'shade confusion."' Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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B. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision unanimously
in an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer.127 The Court began by recog-
nizing the broad language of the Lanham Act and the "basic underlying
principles of trademark law," which it said "would seem to include color
within the universe of things that can qualify as a trademark."1 28 Color
was found to be capable of attaining secondary meaning by helping a
consumer identify a product.129 The Court stated that: "[O]ver time,
customers may come to treat a particular color on a product or its pack-
aging ... as signifying a brand." 130 Thus, the Court found that color
may merit protection because "the law helps [to] assure a producer that
it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-
related rewards associated with a desirable product." 131 The Court re-
jected the notion that the functionality doctrine is an absolute bar to the
registration of color because "sometimes color is not essential to a prod-
uct's use or purpose and does not affect cost or quality.. "132
The Court responded to Jacobson's claim that "four special reasons"
should justify a prohibition against granting trademark protection for
color.133 The Court found that shade confusion would not create unsolv-
able conflicts over whether similar shades confuse customers and con-
stitute infringement. 134 The Court stated that "[c]ourts traditionally de-
cide quite difficult questions about whether two words or phrases or
symbols are sufficiently similar, in context to confuse buyers." 135 The
Court recognized that although color presents unique problems, as it
may appear different in various lights, such as "morning sun" and
"twilight mist,"136 this quality should not prevent a color as serving as a
trademark. The Court analogized differences between shades of color
with differences between words, which courts have successfully handled
in the past. 137 However, it failed to recognize that words, unlike color,
provide several grounds for comparison, such as spelling, meaning,
127. Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
128. Id. at 1302.
129. Id. at 1303.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1304.
133. Id. at 1305.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id
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sound, as well as appearance. Color is different due to the fact that its
comparison can only be based on visual perception.
Second, Jacobson contended that "colors are in limited supply ... [so
that] if one of many competitors can appropriate a particular color for
use as a trademark, and each competitor then tries to do the same, the
supply of colors will soon be depleted."138 The Court determined that
color depletion would be an "occasional problem," but should not result
in a "blanket prohibition."139 Furthermore, tile Court found that the
functionality doctrine would aid in the prevention of such "anti-
competitive consequences."1 40 However, it is difficult to imagine that
there are no anti-competitive consequences of trademark protection for
color because of the potential for color depletion. Once a color is used as
a trademark by a company, a competitor is likely to use a similar yet
distinctive shade of the protected color. As greater numbers of competi-
tors enter the market, the ability to compete is naturally reduced. Addi-
tionally, problems of shade confusion would emerge as a by-product of
robust competition.
Third, Jacobson relied upon precedent to support its position. 14 1 Tile
Supreme Court found that the history and purpose of the Lanham Act
"undercuts the authority of the precedent on which Jacobson relies." 142
The Court concluded that much of the case law cited "rested on state-
ments in Supreme Court opinions that interpreted pre-Lanham Act
trademark law and were not directly related to the holdings in those
cases." 143 Though the Lanham Act has a broad construction, the per se
prohibition against trademark protection for color has been the prevail-
ing view for nearly a century. 144 There is merit in the argument that long
standing precedents create predictability and uniformity in the law,
which are qualities that are valued in American jurisprudence.
Fourth, Jacobson argued that trade dress protection adequately pro-
tects color which may receive protection in combination with a design or
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1306.
140. Id. at 1307.
141. Id. (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U.S. 143 (1920). A.
Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co.. 201 U.S. 166 (1906);
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1878)).
142. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
143. Id.
144. See Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727 (6th Cir. 1906).
This case was decided over 30 years before the Lanham Act was enacted and the court
held that "appropriating colors... would soon take all the colors not in use by [any]
complaintant, and thus cover the entire field [of colors] at once:' Id. at 730.
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symbol.145 However, the Court was not persuaded by this reasoning be-
cause "one can easily find reasons why the law might provide trademark
protection in addition to trade dress protection."1 46 The Court stated that
"a firm might want to use color, pure and simple, instead of color as part
of a design."1 47 The Court arguably gave too much weight to the desires
of such firms, and not enough to the problems inherent in granting
trademark protection for color in its brief discussion of pre-Qualitex
protection for color.
The Supreme Court concluded that absent a justification for a per se
bar against granting trademark protection for color, and in light of the
fact that Qualitex had met the traditional trademark requirements,
Qualitex should retain its trademark. 148
CONCLUSION: SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES FACE THOSE SEEKING
TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR COLOR
The problems inherent in seeking trademark protection for color were
neatly described in Cooper Industries v. Channelock: 149
[s]omewhat daunting conditions ... are necessary for a color mark to be
protected. First, there must not be a competitive need for the color within
the particular market. Second, the use of color must be non-functional
and non-utilitarian. Third, the registrant must show that the color mark
had achieved secondary meaning under Section 2(f) of the Lanham
Act. 15 0
It may at first seem that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Qualitex, colors may easily receive trademark protection. However, once
the relevant case law has been examined, however, it becomes apparent
that rather unusual circumstances must be present to meet the trademark
requirements. Because of the inherent nature of color and its frequent
use in the packaging and marketing of products, it is particularly chal-
lenging to find a product and color match that may result in the acquisi-
tion of trademark protection. This difficulty can be seen in Ambrit v.
145. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id The Supreme Court accepted the district court's undisputed findings that tile
color had met the traditional trademark requirements: "[tlhe evidence showed that read-
ers of a trade publication associated the green-gold color with Qualitex, and the 'SUN
GLOW' pad had acquired secondary meaning, as a result of its long and exclusive use by
Qualitex." Id.
149. 788 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
150. Id. at 877-78.
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Kraft,151 a case in which a frozen dessert producer was denied protec-
tion for use of the color royal blue for its ice cream product. 152 For
similar reasons, the court in Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd. 153
found that the color black was not eligible for trademark protection
when used on outboard motors.154
Once that match is made, it is an equally difficult challenge to demon-
strate that unique situation to the Board and the courts. The evidentiary
burden of demonstrating secondary meaning and lack of functionality is
a large one, as was shown by Owens-Corning.155
Shade confusion and color depletion will remain concerns of the
Board and courts, though they cannot act as a per se bar against regis-
tered trademark protection in light of Qualitex. The court in Master
Distributors v. Pako156 stated the proposition that "[t]riers of fact must
often answer close and difficult questions, and the traditional likelihood
of confusion standard should be applied to distinguish similar colors, as
it is when similar slogans, symbols, or words are compared."157
This may be an overly simplistic argument because comparisons of
slogans and words provide a greater variety of grounds for comparison.
In Qualitex, the Supreme Court used the example of the trademarks
"Cyclone" and "Tornado" by wire fence companies as marks readily
distinguished by a court. 158 The Court did not state how such a compari-
son would be different from one between colors. In the case of
"Cyclone" and "Tornado," for example, the words have the same mean-
ing, conjure up the same visual image and the spelling of each of these
words may be altered while preserving the sound. However, the Si-
preme Court had to rely primarily on its visual determination that Jacob-
son's colored press pads were too similar to those sold by Qualitex.
Symbols functioning as trademarks require a visual analysis. They ar-
guably have more grounds for comparison than color because a symbol
may have, for example, a historical or cultural meaning.
In Master Distributors v. Pako,159 the court stated that "we believe
that not allowing manufacturers to protect color marks when all the tra-
ditional requirements have been met will actually promote inconsistency
151. 812 F.2d 1531 (Ilth Cir. 1986), cerl. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
152. Id. at 1549.
153. 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
154. Id. at 1530.
155. 774 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
156. 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993).
157. Id. at 223. See Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300. 1305 (1995).
158. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305.
159. 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993).
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and confusion." 160 Great challenges remain for those seeking to obtain
registered trademark protection, but the possibility of meeting these
challenges exist. In sum, companies should take advantage of the possi-
bilities for using color as a trademark under Qualitex, and be fully aware
of the fight ahead of them. 16 1
Jennifer D. Silverman
160. Id. at 223.
161. Two federal courts have dealt with the issue of protection for color after the
Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex. In both cases, the courts denied protection for the
colors. See Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., Inc., 65 F.3d 1063, 1071 (2d
Cir. 1995) (finding that plaintiff had not established secondary meaning in a trade dress
action for its black cosmetic compacts because "the color black does not act as a symbol
and distinguish Mana's compacts" from those of its competitors.' The court also noted
that "plaintiff failed to submit any consumer surveys, information as to the relative mar-
ket share of its cosmetics, unsolicited media coverage, or the amount of time that the
compacts made exclusive use of the challenged design."); Ellison Educ. Equip., Inc. v.
Tekservices, Inc., No. 8 Civ. 94-00350, 1995 WL 606814, *7 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 1995)
(denying trade dress protection for colors used to display plaintiff's product in its cata-
log. The court found that the colors had not acquired secondary meaning and were not
inherently distinctive, and that the defendant's use of the colors in its catalog was not
likely to cause customer confusion).
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